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RESTRICTED 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF FUTURE NAVY PLANNING 
A lecture delivered by 
Vice Admiral Robert B. Carney, USN 
at the Naval War College 
September 13, 1949 
Much has been written about planning, and there is good 
machinery now in existence at all levels for its accomplishment. 
Workable formats, techniques, procedures, and organizations for 
planning have evolved under the pressures of war and in the at­
mosphere of joint effort. Strategic planning is being geared to 
logistical considerations ; the necessa:ry industrial and economic as­
pects have been woven into the planning pattern; and, more re­
cently, the all-important dollar has been introduced as the yard­
stick for strategic capability as well as logistical implementation. 
Not that this is the planner's millenium; the need for im­
provement will always continue in some measure, and it can be 
safely assumed that, as the relationship of strategic, logistical and 
budgetary planning becomes more universally understood, methods 
will be susceptible of further improvement. Nevertheless, mechan­
isms and progress are reasonably well in hand. 
Such being the case, it is well to pause from time to time 
to examine the philosophy and the precepts upon which our plan­
ning is predicated. Such introspection is always more or less in 
order, but there are added reasons for taking philosophical inventory 
at this particular tinie. This is a year critical in the annals of in­
ternational developments, a year attracting the closest attention 
of economists and industrialists, and a revolutionary year in Ameri­
can military annals. 
Vice Admiral Carney is the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for 
Logistics. During World War II he served as Admiral Halsey's 
Chief of Staff. 
1 
1
Carney: The Foundations of Future Navy Planning
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949
RESTRICTED 
With the signing of the Atlantic Pact and the consideration 
of military aid programs, the United States-and, for that matter, 
all of the allied world of like-thinking peoples-are embarking on a 
new concept (or re-embarking on the old concept) of security 
through mutual strength. The United States must now consider 
the potential strength-and weaknesses-of those nations associ­
ated with us in seeking security for civilization. 
In the world of economics, the United States is confronted 
with increasing demands on its resources, while at the same time 
facing the probability of diminishing national revenues from which 
our obligations must be financed. 
Narrowing the field of consideration to military matters, those 
who are responsible for fashioning the structure of military secur­
ity are confronted with the tremendously complex problem of best 
relating ideal strategy, strategic capability, forces, and logistic 
support to the dwindling dollars available. Budgetary restrictions 
prevent us from achieving the ideal in the land, sea, and air 
strengths which would guarantee complete security. It is there­
fore necessary to determine the character and degree of emphasis 
that must be accorded each service and each weapon-and here 
there is an inevitable clash between the convictions of the ad­
vocates of differing viewpoints. 
Further delimiting the area inspected, we find that within 
the Naval Establishment many important needs must of necessity be 
subjected to paring in order to conform to the limitations of the 
navy's purse. 
The planners at the national level, the joint planners of the 
military establishment, and the planners in the military depart­
ments are all beset by problems of great gravity at this particular 
time; and, unless their respective plans are predicated on sound 
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philosophy and assumptions, our future as a nation could well be 
jeopardized. 
This year of 1949, then, being a critical year in international, 
economic, and military affairs, it behooves us to indulge in some 
unbiased and objective thinking. Perhaps, theoretically, we should 
wait until the philosophy of the nation and of the security organi­
zation are well crystallized before venturing to an appraisal of the 
Navy's thinking, but pressure of events denies us that breathing 
spell; moreover, there are many factors which we can profitably. 
examine now and which brook no delay. 
So, at the risk of overshooting the mark, I shall essay a 
vignette of the Navy's current position, some of the factors that 
have contributed to our position, and some thoughts concerning 
courses of action for the future. 
Any appraisal of the Navy's present and future must be done 
against the backdrop of unification. Unification is here; the will 
of the people was expressed in the National Security Act of 1947, 
and it has been forcibly reaffirmed by the modifications enacted 
into law this summer. The pattern is established; should parts of 
the mosaic appear to lack perspective from the Navy's point of ob­
servation, nevertheless we are bound by the laws of our country 
and by the time-tested military proprieties. "Fighting the problem" 
is unintelligent and may even come to be regarded as something 
more serious than lack of intelligence. Reasoned disagreements must 
be entrusted to the democratic processes-they take time, but 
proof of their merit lies in the record of American achievement. 
As a philosophical point of departure, then, face up to the 
fa-it accompli of centralized authority and the potent fiscal controls 
through which this new plan for national military administration is 
being effectuated. 
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An objective appraisal of the Navy's current fortunes can 
only lead to the conviction that the Navy's position has been weak­
ened. Measured in terms of forces, appropriations, and capabilities, 
there could be no other conclusion. If roles and missions are used as 
the yardstick, we are confronted with the fact that majority senti­
ment favors less comprehensive Navy functions than was the case in 
the last war. It also seems to be the concensus of opinion that in 
the realm of public relations our position leaves much to be desired. 
To say that the Navy's over-all status has been impaired 
seems to be a sound basic assumption. However, the true significance 
of the fact can only be derived when we regard our situation in 
conjunction with an examination into the trend of world affairs, 
the complexion of our economy, the evolution of strategic thinking, 
and the fortunes of our sister services. Only in that way can we hope 
to measure our existing strength in proper perspective. 
The national military budget affords a good starting point. 
It is obvious that fewer dollars and rising costs necessitate reduc­
tions. It should be equally obvious that our vast VJ-day forces, pipe­
lines, and installations could not and should not be maintained. On 
this account, then, shrinking should be expected, accepted, and ac­
complished. 
Inter-service competition for dollars has been widely de­
plored, but dollars furnish a measure of capability. Dollar-wise, the 
Navy's budget is declining, and this in spite of the Navy's thirty­
nine-billion-dollar material inventory and its widespread D-day 
commitments. This sort of reduction we can not regard with com­
placency. 
An even more serious matter concerns the various pressures 
in behalf of restricting the Navy's roles and missions. In this con­
nection, the very potent influence of dollar limitations should be
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noted-enforced defaulting on a responsibility through lack of ap­
propriations to provide forces and facilities. Here again we must 
be alert to the need for disseminating the justification of Navy 
roles and missions. 
At this point, it can be inferred that some of our reductions 
are right and proper, and that others, to our way of thinking, are 
not in the best interests of national security. The problem is to 
differentiate wisely between the logical and illogical. 
Unfortunately, clear discernment is rarely a function of dis­
appointment. The men who brought Naval Aviation from its be­
ginnings to its peak find it bitter hard to see their life's work 
whittled down. Likewise, the leaders of the Marine Corps who 
built and fought the Corps through its new and greater traditions 
of World War II can not accept with equanimity any diminishing of 
the stature of our elite fighting corps. The same could be said for 
the men who conceived and fosteredthe Seabees-and even the poor 
old battleship admirals. 
In virtually every segment of the service, people _are wit:. 
nessing a lessening of lustre and influence. Naturally, these people 
fight back and fight hard. 
And yet, a certain amount of change is inevitable. Inter­
national alignments, political objectives, scientific developments, 
the geography of strategy, the distribution of natural resources, 
the facts of economics-all of these things point clearly to the fact 
that should another war befall us, it is only reasonable to expect 
that the composition of our forces will differ in many- respects from 
the armies, fleets, and air armadas of World War II. They would 
differ if for no other reasons than that the potentialities of the 
adversaries would be different and many new battlegrounds would 
be involved. An objective view of such factors as these can lead 
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to recognition and acceptance of justifiable changes in our res­
ponsibilities. It will also serve to isolate proposals not consistent 
with sea power's verities. 
The Navy reaffirms the need for naval attack aviation, the 
· need for the Marine Corps as the masters of amphibious landings,
the potency of the submarine, the essentiality of antisubmarine
forces, the vital importance of seaborne commerce and seaborne
movement, the need for navy-trained gunfire support and support­
air operations for amphibious landings, the requirement that we
control our own logistic support, and many other proven seapower
principles and battle-tested techniques. Nevertheless, the charac­
ter and geography of any possible opponents of the future are such
as to make it most unlikely that an exact duplicate of our 1945
forces would again be required.
Without conceding the validity of any proposal to alter the 
basic functions and responsibilities of the Navy, common sense 
demands recognition of dollar realities and recognition of the fact 
that new tasks confront us in the future. By the same token, not 
every chapter of World War II will repeat itself in the history of 
the future. 
The moral, at this point, is that in times of peace the tend­
ency is to scale down all military activities, and that cutbacks of 
that sort are not per se, prima facie evidence of the abolition of 
roles and missions. Nicety of perception is called for in order to dis­
tinguish between wise economy and unwise efforts to handcuff the 
nation's ability to make full use of its capabilities for controlling 
the seas and denying it to our enemies. 
In many respects, our most serious setbacks have been in 
the area of public relations. The causes are complex, deep-seated, 
and in many cases of ancient origin. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
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isolate and identify some of the happenings which influence think­
ing with respect to the Navy and sea power. 
In the first place, the public has never been made properly 
aware of the Navy's wartime accomplishments; this is largely at­
tributable to ultraconservatism and a faulty evaluation of the ad­
vantages and disadvantages of secrecy. In any event, we are still 
suffering from wartime anonymity. 
There were irritations that grew out of the war-pulling 
and hauling in Washington-conflicting demands between theaters 
-unfortunate interferences between services-smarting after­
maths in the wake of publicity difficulties-dissatisfactions rooted
in matters of service or individual prestige.
In one respect, good performance has boomeranged. Through 
farsighted planning and successful execution, the Navy had achieved 
most of its goals and was well satisfied with its position in 
the military scheme of things. In a manner of speaking, we had be­
come capitalists in this military world and were quite content to 
be left alone; there was little that we envied or coveted. On the 
other hand, there is no gainsaying the fact that from other van­
tage points some of our treasures looked like ill-gotten gains. The 
thought has been expressed that in certain fields we had usurped 
functions not properly belonging to a navy, and had been guilty of 
costly and unnecessary duplications. 
Without attempting to determine the merits or demerits of 
the matter, we must recognize the existence of such thinking in 
order to understand history and so to see more clearly the best 
paths leading to the future. 
Then there was "merger". For the purposes of this dis­
cussion, the subject deserves mention only as a factor which has a 
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bearing on the evolution of public opinion. Around the postwar 
council tables, the Navy has frequently been in a minority of one. 
The public is not aware of the many points of agreement, and the 
public heard nothing of Navy proposals for changes for the simple 
reason that the Navy was not seeking changes; readers only heard 
of Navy dissent. Ergo, there flowered the impression that the Navy 
was constantly blocking unification. 
Rightly or wrongly, people wearied of the argument-and 
wearied of a navy viewpoint which nutured argument .. 
So, oddly enough, wartime accomplishment and some fine, 
postwar achievements were lost to sight in the outer darkness 
created by the focusing of the spotlight on other matters. Some of 
these latter-day jobs deserve mention. 
Immediately upon the termination of war, a comprehensive 
and well-planned Naval Reserve program was instituted; today the 
Naval Reserve is a model civilian component program. The Navy 
had demobilization plans completed before VJ-day and carried out 
a rapid, disciplined, and orderly demobilization. The preservation 
of the reserve fleet was a high achievement in the field of technical 
planning and management, with the result that the Navy's re­
serve of weapons is preserved intact and available. The Navy's dis­
posed of its surplus material in orderly fashion and retained the 
items that would be needed for the future; the things on the re­
tention list were retrieved, overhauled, preserved, catalogued, and 
then put on the shelf as a part of an integrated war reserve pro­
gram. The Navy established an integrated supply system. The 
Navy immediately instituted a modernization program for its fleet, 
and a shipbuilding program specializing in prototypes which would 
embody the accomplishments from the fields of research and de­
velopment. We promptly established an operational development 
force to evaluate new weapons and techniques and to put them 
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into workable shape for general fleet use. The Navy has main­
tained its combat efficiency in the face of every postwar obstacle. 
These examples bespeak sound and effective thinking, plan­
ning, administration, and operational effort. Could it be that mere 
efficiency isn't news? 
And now to briefly cast up the account. 
We see the Navy position weakened. 
We see logical reasons for some reductions in naval strength, 
and we discern other downward pressures which appear neither 
logical nor sound. 
Organizationally, we have become a cog in a machine in 
which the other enmeshed wheels exert a continuous and inter­
locking pressure. Gone are the days in which we formulated our 
own concept of sea power, and, in collaboration with industry and 
the old naval affairs committees, blueprinted the composition and 
strength of the nation's fleets. 
With an understanding of the past and the present, we can 
consider our plans for the future. With your indulgence, we will 
leave the details of planning to the planners; the foundations of our 
future planning are vastly more important. 
Before worrying about our relative fortunes vis-a-vis the 
Army and Air Force, our first job is perfecting the Navy we have. 
I hark back to days after the first World War when we got down 
to 86,000 men, had only one active squadron of destroyers in the 
Pacific, and there was solemn conviction that the Navy had gone 
to hell. According to my best calculations, I would just about 
reach my hundredth b-irthday before achieving four stripes (I gave 
no thought to the age of the gentlemen on the selection board). 
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Fortunately, some tough old characters took the wheel and res­
tored discipline, efficiency, hope, and self-respect-the elements of 
the much-abused term "morale". 
If I exhume the good old days, it is only by way of remind­
ing ourselves that a fighting navy can, did, and will overcome 
every obstacle to preeminence. 
And now to convert philosophy to plain talk. 
We of the Navy are American citizens, members of the De­
partment of Defense, professional experts in the business of sea 
power, and practitioners in the art of leadership. As such, we have 
a multiple obligation to the citizenry, to the American military 
team, to our naval seniors, to our subordinates-and to ourselves. 
None of those obligations must be evaded. 
Being a military service, we properly draw inspiration from 
our traditions, but the story of the past must be screened to find 
lessons useful for the future. We can look to John Paul Jones 
for the criteria of a fighting gentleman's character without letting 
contracts for sisterships of the Bon Homme Rickard. Don't confuse 
the weapons and techniques of past glories with the basic princi­
ples of sea power, for, although the fundamentals of sea power are 
immutable, its tools change. 
The past yields lessons and traditions, but do not bemoan 
its passing. Devote yourselves to finding quicker, cheaper, and 
better solutions to the myriad problems of the present and future. 
Perfect yourselves in every job to which assigned. Learn 
the art of command by seeking opportunities to lead, and by sitting 
attentively at the feet of experience. Knowledge is the foundation of 
strength, usefulness, and leadership. 
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Work unceasingly to perpetuate the Navy's rightful pride 
in its thoroughness, integrity, loyalty-up, and loyalty-down. 
Learn all you can about the Army and the Air Force; unifica­
tion is a fact of life, and there are countless new tangencies with 
the other services. 
Do the best you can with what you have. If circumstances 
give the Navy less than you think is needed, find new ways of main­
taining our high and uncompromising standards. 
Subordinate your corps or specialty to the general welfare 
of the Navy� 
Subordinate your Navy partisanship to the laws, rules, and.
regulations of unification in furtherance of the American milita1-y 
team. Competition is healthy and esprit de corps is vital to a 
fighting organization, but good judgment is needed to prevent 
esprit de corps from degenerating into unproductive isolation. 
Adhere to the sound tenets of sea power's credo. The Navy 
needs the tools to defeat any obstacle to our control of the sea, 
whatever those tools may be. As experts in sea power, we are 
convinced that this · is so, and we should unswervingly adhere to 
our convictions. Your country must not be beguiled into giving 
up one of its great and dearly-bought power aces-sea supremacy. 
Your loyalty to sea power is loyalty to your country and deserves 
your keen, constant, and articulate support. 
Be frank and fearless in your considered counsels. No valid 
exception can ever be taken to forthright and mature opinion; there 
need be no inconsistency between honest belief and loyal compliance 
with the dictates of constituted authority. 
Unceasingly study the possible threats to sea power and 
seek to devise new means of exercising it for our own benefit and 
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denying its use to enemies. By so doing, we will not only solve the 
future's problems, we may well shape the future itself. 
Do these things and the country need have no fear for its 
supremacy at sea. Do these things and you need have no fear 
for the Navy's future-you will be too busy. 
Gentlemen, twice in my lifetime I have been through periods 
of demobilization. Once, I observed a decline of American sea power 
resulting from a weary world's hope of finding peace in disarma­
ment. I have witnessed the crumbling of Germany's and Japan's sea 
power as a sure prelude to their defeat. In American history, we 
find. even drearier chapters telling of the utter desuetude to which 
our Navy came early in the nineteenth century and again after the 
Civil War. Today-and I am being completely frank-there is again 
apparent a tendency to minimize the need and importance of sea 
power. In such times the Navy is put to its greatest test. 
There must be no folding up-the challenge must be ac­
cepted. Disappointment is no acceptable signal for discouragement 
-that would be betraying our traditions.
There is boundless opportunity for the individual in the Naval 
Service-and boundless opportunity to serve the United States 
by continuous, intelligent, and courageous advocacy of the Navy's 
proper goals. The opportunities for distinguished service did not 
pass with the distinguished servants of the past. 
There is a job to be done-a job that requires the epitome of 
brains, industry, leadership, and missionary work. The job is an all­
hands maneuver. If every man does his bit unremittingly, cheerfully, 
and to the best of his ability, we will always be able to take pride 
in the fact that this country has a Navy second to none-and that 
the Navy is occupying its proper place in the scheme of national se­
curity and world peace. 
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